Canalization and Creative Evolution: Images of Life in Bergson and Whitehead by Posteraro, Tano
  
 
Canalization and Creative Evolution: Images of Life in Bergson and 
Whitehead 
Tano Posteraro 
 
 
The status of life in nature . . . is the modern problem of philosophy and 
of science. 
    —Whitehead 1938: 202. 
 
And it must be compared to an impetus, because no image borrowed 
from the physical world can give more nearly the idea of it. But it is 
only an image. 
—Bergson 1998: 257. 
 
Images and metaphors are essential to the organization of scientific discourse. We think 
through them, use them not only as explanatory aids, but as calipers first: without them, we’re 
unable to grasp and articulate our objects of study at all, even before the endeavour to communicate 
what it is we’ve managed to grasp. In this paper I take up the ‘canal’ of modern embryology, an 
image for the way epigenetic landscapes operate in order to bring about, or canalize, a small 
number of end results from a larger landscape of developmental potentialities. I trace the history 
of that image from out of Bergson’s Creative Evolution, through Whitehead’s Process and Reality, 
and into the embryological theory of C.H. Waddington. I do three things in this paper: I situate the 
image of the canal in Bergson’s philosophy of life; I demonstrate its utility to Whitehead’s 
metaphysics; and I argue that the canal occupies a privileged position in Bergson’s thought, and is 
therefore worth rethinking in terms of Whitehead’s philosophy as well. For the canal is turned 
against itself, implemented (as an image) in order to expose the limitations of imagistic thought—
of which science is a particularly significant case. The canal metaphorizes the limitations of 
thinking evolution through its material determinations. The image isolates and delimits what 
exceeds it. That means that the image of the canal purports to explain the relation between life and 
matter by way of the same operation of delimitation through which matter relates to life. I conclude 
the paper with a series of comments on this point: that it was the image of the canal that found its 
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way into modern embryology tells us something important about the relation between science and 
philosophy, or between image and imagination, matter and life. Here, Bergson and Whitehead 
converge on a philosophy of nature that is capable both of responding to scientific discoveries as 
well as of accommodating them within an enlarged process-oriented metaphysics.  
 Life, for Bergson, is not something other than matter; it is composed of virtual tendencies 
to differentiate that are immanent to materiality; it is, better put, the elaboration of those tendencies 
from out of materiality, negotiated against matter’s own spatializing habits or proclivities. Life is 
the effort to develop as far as possible the indeterminacy it finds in matter. Whitehead calls it a 
“bid for freedom”: life pushes against matter’s habit to stay what it is, to return to what it was, 
opening it onto unrealized potentials and new possibilities. Life is, to be sure, importantly different 
from the materiality in which it’s always embodied, but nonetheless, as Elizabeth Grosz puts the 
point, it “utilizes the same resources, the same forces, the same mobilities characterizing the 
material order” (2007: 11). Materiality is characterized by its uniformity, law-like regularity, its 
fixity, stability, even stasis. These are tendencies toward spatialization, toward the image.  
Life is characterized by an opposing set of propensities: toward time, change, novelty, 
invention—all in excess over the delimitations of the material image. But the two are immanent to 
each other, co-imbricated, coterminous. There is no matter without some degree of indeterminacy, 
some minimal temporal spread, a vibratory duration; and there is no life apart from its material 
instantiations, its becoming-spatialized in its images. So life—the élan vital, the impetus driving 
evolutionary change—is that through which the actual is submitted to processes of change and 
transformation, materiality’s organizing force. But organized bodies cannot, on Bergson’s account, 
be decomposed analytically, cannot be attained by the combination of their constituent parts. 
Organization is, in a somewhat technical sense, strictly indivisible—which is to say, it is the work 
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of virtuality, the coexistence of divergent tendencies. Organization is not fabrication. To fabricate 
is to assemble, piece by piece, until a whole is achieved; but organization proceeds from the center 
outward, in explosive waves through which the whole is successively reconfigured anew (Bergson 
1998: 92). The manufactured or fabricated thing reflects “exactly the form of the work of 
manufacturing it” (92). Each of its parts represents a part of the work that went into it. But the 
parts of an organism do not correspond to parts of the work of its organization. Organization is a 
process of actualization, of the contraction of virtual tendencies and their elaboration from out of 
materiality’s own habits.  
 Bergson holds that the materiality of a living body “does not represent a sum of means 
employed, but a sum of obstacles avoided” (93). He calls it a “negation rather than a positive 
reality” (93). Take the eye. What obstacle is indicated in its material configuration? Of what is it 
a negation? The eye incarnates and facilitates a power of vision, which, “by right,” should—in 
theory—attain to an infinity of visible things (93). But we can see, on Bergson’s phenomenological 
account, only what we can act upon; visibility is coextensive with the world of effective 
engagement, our “niche.” The determination of the power to see in terms of what the body can do 
suggests an inhibition: the function of the organ, restricted by its materiality. That materiality is a 
limitation on how far life can elaborate itself out of matter. Bergson calls the movement, or 
impulsion, behind that elaboration the positive reality of evolutionary change. It’s what drives it. 
Materiality, then, insofar as it is organized by the vital force that it restricts, determines, or 
spatializes in turn, is the negative outline around life’s positive thrust. But beyond a frustration, 
the materiality of the eye is also an achievement: it reflects the series of obstacles that the function 
of vision had to overcome in order to realize itself in the organ that it did. The bird’s eye is 
testament to the progress made by vision beyond more primitive pigmentary masses.  
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 When it comes to the relation between life and its material instantiation in the organism, 
Bergson calls on another image, that of the canal. The process by which a canal is formed cannot 
be explained by the accumulation of dirt that will become its banks. Neither can that dirt explain 
what the canal is, what it’s for. Banks are dug, and they indicate the effort of digging them only 
negatively, in outline. A canal’s banks function to facilitate a flow of water through them. But 
again, they suggest that flow only by silhouetting it. Canalization, understood as a process, refers 
to this double relation: of the banks to the effort of digging them, and of the canal to the flow that 
it contours. Both that effort and that flow stand to the banks as life does to matter. The one 
organizes the other while exceeding and moving through it. Canalization serves as an image for 
the work of the élan, which, considered in itself—independently of the matter to which it is 
always actually immanent—is an invisible movement whose products are the bodies organized 
by it, the same bodies that arrest or reroute its creative advance. The essence of a canal is its 
negative space—and in this respect, the composition of its banks is secondary to the fact that the 
banks work to guide a current of water through them.  
 Bergson initially invokes the image of the canal in the context of his discussion of 
organization. That a body is organized means, on his account, that it is something more than the 
sum of its parts. Organization is not the effect of combination. Parts and their possible 
arrangements are secondary issues: first comes the work of organization correlative with the 
organized whole, and only afterward can we decompose the body, study its parts, and try to build 
it back up out of them. This last step makes up the remit of scientific study. It’s also why science 
tends toward mechanistic explanation. Scientific analysis works in terms of parts. Parts work 
mechanically. Bergson accepts this, but makes the study of parts derivative on the activity of 
organizing them. Organization is not fabrication. Fabrication, or the activity of producing an 
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artifact by working on some unformed material, works from the peripheries of its material toward 
the center, from the disaggregated many toward the made, integrated one. Fabrication operates 
along the axis of finalism (103). Organization corresponds, then, to the dissociative activity of the 
élan and its inverted finalism: effecting change from the center outward, from the one toward the 
many. That means that “to each part of the [fabricated] work corresponds a part of the result” (92), 
precisely because fabrication works part by part, building out of an initially disparate set of them 
a unified whole. Organization is different. A living body’s parts reflect the work of its organization 
only negatively, only after the fact. Bergson thinks that science should treat organized bodies as if 
they were fabricated ones. It’s only then that science can hope to grasp how they work. But in so 
doing, science decomposes—which is to say that it spatializes, delimits—bodies whose principle 
of organization evades that decomposition. It is in that productive omission that science gains its 
explanatory footing. And it is for this idea that canalization is supposed to serve as an image.  
 The eye is Bergson’s organized body of choice. This is because the vision of a living 
being is always effective, “limited to objects on which the being can act” (93). Bergson calls 
vision’s limitation “the work of canalizing” (93). The material configuration of a given visual 
apparatus in view of what it can see, on what the organism can act, is an effect of its canalization. 
This is what makes the organ’s material parts like the banks of a canal—secondary to what flows 
through them, indicating that flow only in contour. That flow, for Bergson, is of course the élan 
itself. The visible structure through which it moves—the canal, its banks and floors; the visual 
apparatus—is only the present sediment of the effort by which it’s constructed, the limits or 
outline of its canalized flow. The digging of the canal is a generative, but invisible movement, 
which is to say that its visible products represent it only negatively. The canal is the by-product 
of that work. By analogy, the visual apparatus is a material by-product of the invisible movement 
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flowing through it, the élan. The point is that organisms can’t be understood in terms only of 
their material composition, because that composition is the sedimentation of the vital force that 
incited its organization.  
 Canalization is an image for how it is that one indivisible movement manifests itself in a 
series of determinate and (therefore) divisible material configurations. That movement, oriented 
in the direction of a perfected vision, is instantiated in various visual apparatuses across different 
evolutionary lineages. So the apparatus is like the canal in the two senses of that analogy already 
indicated. First, “the visual apparatus is no more explained by the assembling of its anatomic 
elements than the digging of a canal could be explained by the heaping-up of the earth which might 
have formed its banks” (93). Adaptationism holds that these elements had been coordinated 
gradually, through a series of accidents, until the function had been achieved—as if, in order to 
explain a well-built canal, it would suffice to describe its banks as accumulations of dirt. Finalism 
holds that the banks could have become functional only if they were constructed according to a 
plan. Both accounts hold that the effort responsible for the accomplishment of the functional canal 
can be divided into a series of acts, whether accidental or planned. Thus, both adaptationism and 
finalism treat organized bodies as if they were products of fabrication. 
But processes of canalization are strictly indivisible. That’s because the élan is time to the 
space of its material determinations. It endures through its spatializations. Or, to repeat an earlier 
formulation: the time of life elaborates itself out of matter’s spatiality. We shouldn’t miss, then, 
the resonances between the image of the canal and the ancient relationship established between 
time and a flowing river. Bergson thinks that the image of an invisible hand drawn through iron 
filings helps make the point. The filings arrange themselves around the trajectory taken by the 
hand. That trajectory is traversed—recalling Zeno’s arrow—in one indivisible temporally 
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continuous movement, in accordance with the degree of effort that drove it. Adaptationists and 
finalists alike look only at the filings and see in them a positive explanation for their arrangement. 
Both accounts miss the fact that the filings canalize the movement of the hand: they resist it, 
organize themselves around it, and so express the effort responsible for the hand’s movement only 
negatively (94-95). The functional integration of the visual apparatus is, on this image, not to be 
explained by the arrangement of its material parts, whether by accident or design, but rather by 
recourse to the effort responsible for its activation. The greater the hand’s effort, the further will 
be its trajectory through the filings that resist it. This is Bergson’s model for vision as well, for the 
visual organ’s sophistication—its degree of complexity and coordination—stands in direct 
proportion to the effort or advancement of “the undivided act constituting vision” (95). The 
tendency toward vision canalizes the visual apparatus. 
 The act is also canalized by its material substrate. This is the image’s second valence. The 
visual apparatus is not only an effect of the tendency toward vision, but also a means for its 
accomplishment. Here another image is brought into play. Bergson likens the relationship between 
the directions taken by evolution and what he calls its material “sinuosities” to the relationship 
between the construction of a road and the distance covered by it. “The road that leads to the town 
is,” as Bergson says, “obliged to follow the ups and downs of the hills; it adapts itself to the 
accidents of the ground” (102). The soil on which the road is constructed is its indispensible 
condition. And yet, the “accidents of the ground” neither cause nor direct the course covered by 
the road. It is in vain that we look for that cause or that direction in the road’s material conditions. 
It is to be found only in the fact of what the road is: i.e., a means for getting from one point to 
another. The fact that one can follow the road, journey across it—this is the road’s essential 
meaning. Its materiality facilitates but does not explain this fact. Later, in the final pages of 
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Creative Evolution, Bergson returns to this image, supplementing the river for the road: “the 
movement of the stream is,” he writes, “distinct from the river bed, although it must adopt its 
winding course” (270). So too must vision adapt itself to the material organ it has at its disposal. 
The visual apparatus conditions and facilitates the function. But it does not suffice to explain its 
cause. This is also what it means to say that vision is canalized by its organic embodiment. Vision 
is facilitated by the materiality to which it has to adapt itself. Matter canalizes life, provides it a 
substrate, bounds and limits it. But life is something more than its material actualizations, just as 
a road is insufficiently understood on the basis only of the ground on which it is constructed.  
 After establishing canalization as an image for life, Bergson proceeds to employ the word 
in a slightly different sense. The next time he uses the word, Bergson refers to the way an animal’s 
nervous system concentrates “a rudimentary and vague activity” along definite directions as a 
canalization that intensifies what was initially diffuse and minimally effective (110). The canal 
becomes the mechanism by which a large, shallow spread is gathered together in a deeper, focused 
direction. In this sense, the distribution of water over a broad swatch of land is canalized as it 
begins to collect and stream along grooves in the ground. Bergson talks of basic organisms as 
uncoordinated systems of reactive movements (the sensory) and the ability to choose among a 
range of them (the motor). They seem like antagonistic tendencies, but even the most basic living 
thing demonstrates, on this account, a low-level ability to choose among possibilities in response 
to external stimuli. Choice among possible motor options is effected on the basis of an ongoing 
sensory receptivity. Bergson calls the connection between the two systems a kind of canalization 
(126). More sophisticated beings canalize more of their sensory field in terms of the motor 
possibilities available to them. And, indeed, by the end of Creative Evolution, canalization has 
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become a broad term indicating the consolidation of diffuse energy that is characteristic of life in 
general (256).  
It shouldn’t surprise us that Whitehead saw something powerful in Bergson’s image of the 
canal. Process and Reality employs the concept of canalization as an essential principle in the 
explanation of the emergence of order. Whitehead sees in Bergson’s explanation of the canal the 
insight that life can only act creatively within the confines of a material body. Without material 
“brakes” on its tendency to differentiate, life would be able to produce nothing stable at all, nothing 
on which natural selection could subsequently act. That wouldn’t be a victory won on behalf of 
life, but a failure, for totally unrestricted evolution wouldn’t be creative as much as just chaotic. It 
is this positive, productive sense to canalization that Whitehead affirms and develops—it supplies 
order, which is required for creativity and an increase in what he calls “intensity.” Whitehead takes 
the image and reconfigures it: for him, the material of the canal is not a coagulation or 
sedimentation of the invisible movement flowing through it, but an ordering of that flow, the 
articulation of it.  
Whitehead emphasizes the way Bergson utilizes the image at the end of Creative Evolution, 
as a mechanism for the concentration and intensification of an initially diffuse and vague activity. 
Whitehead takes this idea of productive concentration or limitation and decouples it from 
Bergson’s élan. Canalization, in Whitehead’s formulation, refers to the appropriation—
Whitehead’s “prehension”—of an inherited past of consolidated acts and relations. As the 
organism develops, it integrates more and more of its relations and transmits those integrations 
along a temporal line. The organism doesn’t have to constantly decide how to relate to the world; 
in some sense, the outlines of its relation are increasingly rigidified for it—which implies a certain 
degree of irreversibility, just as it implies a developmental tapering in the space of possibilities. It 
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becomes for Whitehead a general metaphysical principle, capable of explaining everything from 
gene expression to the order and continuity required for conscious personality. 
Canalization affords the organism an increase in order, which is just as necessary for the 
intensity of experience as is originality. Originality always moves away from—breaks the 
strictures of—the order out of which it emerges and into which it settles, even if after expanding 
or reshaping it. In biological terms, Whitehead might say that canalization allows the organism to 
take one relatively stable route through a massively chaotic environment—whether interior or 
external. It allows for the relatively reliable expression of phenotype, just as it ensures that different 
organisms of the same species behave in similar ways and so are able to survive in the same niche. 
Creativity, originality—or we might say mutation, anadaptation—requires that reliability as its 
starting point. “Thus life is a passage,” on Whitehead’s account, “from physical order to pure 
mental originality, and from pure mental originality to canalized mental originality” (1978: 107-
8). Creativity, for Whitehead, necessitates some means by which societies of “actual subjects,” or 
existent organisms, can interact with what has yet to come to pass. This is what is meant by “mental 
originality”: the prehension or appropriation of what exists over and above the actual. This is the 
conceptual. If prehensions were simply physical, if they were related only to their actual pasts, 
then novelty would be made impossible from the outset. The universe would be caught in a cycle 
of repetition. Its creative advance is made possible on the basis of the creative decisions of actual 
subjects capable of prehending the physical past as in some sense other than it was; prehending 
the past, that is, conceptually—in the indeterminacy afforded it by what Whitehead calls “eternal 
objects.” If physical feeling relates to the settled facts of the past, then conceptual feeling concerns 
the future, the formal possibilities left open by those facts. Every process of actualization therefore 
concretizes what is initially (or potentially) indeterminate by prehending the conceptual (that is, 
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the eternal objects) along with the actual, thereby adding another layer of realized actuality to the 
ongoing creative advance of the cosmos. Unity and continuity are, on this account, achievements—
not starting points or givens (108). Canalization supplies the mechanism of their explanation.  
C. H. Waddington—a developmental biologist responsible for instigating the conceptual 
revolution in the life sciences known now as “systems biology”—worked out his theory of the 
epigenetic landscape and its branching pathways of development while reading Whitehead’s 
Process and Reality (Gilbert 1991). Waddington draws on Whitehead’s reformulation of the image 
of the canal as the means by which to explain organismic order in the midst of environmental 
variability. For him, that means the reliable production of similar phenotypes in a highly variable 
population, scattered across significantly different environments. Waddington imagines a plane 
into which several divergent canals have taken shape (Waddington 1956: 412). What flows 
through them, on Waddington’s account, is not the élan, but—according to a certain secularization 
of Bergson’s principle—the cell instead. Before becoming canalized along one line of 
development, the cell’s fate is plastic; it can follow any of a number of pathways, each of which 
is contoured by the interactions of various genes. But once the cell begins to develop along certain 
trajectories, it gains in expression—what Whitehead called “intensity”—what it loses in plasticity. 
That’s the key to Waddington’s take on the image: developmental irreversibility. Becoming 
canalized means falling into a groove, taking one pathway of development at the expense of 
initially possible others. “Developmental reactions,” in Waddington’s own words, “are in general 
canalized . . . they are adjusted so as to bring about one end result regardless of minor variations 
in conditions during the course of the reaction” (1941; quoted in Gilbert 1991: 197). Taking 
inspiration from Whitehead’s schema and its redeployment of Bergson’s image of the canal, 
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Waddington was able to develop a theory of epigenetics that, as Adam Wilkins has suggested, was 
nothing short of “a premature discovery” (1997: 257). 
So it’s not hard to see how productive an image can be. But even at their most fecund, our 
images come up against their limits in trying to capture the creativity of life. And that’s instructive. 
Alia Al-Saji has recently taken issue with the image of the canal as Bergson developed it (2010: 
152-153). She’s right to note that the concern behind the image is Bergson’s commitment to the 
claim that living bodies are more than the sum of their parts. Understand those parts materially 
(physico-chemically), and they end up—on his account—looking like the passive, inert products 
of a vital force that organizes them. But Al-Saji thinks that makes that vital force immaterial: and 
the specter of hylomorphism rears its head. I think she misses the fact that the canal is an image 
and not an explanation. But more importantly, I think she misses the relationship between the 
image and what it images on the one hand, and life and its material delimitations on the other. Life 
itself, I claim, operates according to the logic of the image. This is to say that by dissociating and 
differentiating itself through its material incarnations, by securing determination along a series of 
individual organic bodies, life becomes image. Organic bodies are the spatialized cessations to the 
creative impulse that images are to the material whole and the ontological past. Put differently, 
there is a structural isomorphy that obtains between the logic of the élan and the inability of the 
image to exhaust its explanandum; or yet again, between the relation of the élan to living things 
and the relation of perceptual images to the material universe, which is always in a process-
relational movement of becoming that the image cuts and determines.  This means that scientific 
analysis is also structurally analogous to perceptual experience, for both operate by isolating a 
thing from its relations, by dividing a whole into parts—which is not necessarily misguided, but 
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does risk taking for the whole what is only an isolated set of elements, as is the case with mechanist 
biology.  
Understood in this context, the image of the canal is not the regrettable misstep Al-Saji 
takes it to be. In fact, it occupies a particularly interesting position in Bergson’s understanding of 
life. The canal, as an image for the relation between life and matter, is an image, a halt or 
spatialization, deployed as a means by which to explain precisely that same limitation imposed on 
life by matter. That makes the canal an image that is turned against itself. Canalization is supposed 
to explain why it is that what is essential about living wholes cannot be captured spatially without 
recourse to the temporally self-differentiating vitality that activates them. But it is supposed to 
accomplish this as an image, which is, on Bergson’s account, characterized by the same 
spatializing operation that it is implemented in order to expose. The canal is uniquely situated as 
an image; it is a spatialization of thought intended to demonstrate the inadequacy of spatialized 
thinking. I do not presume that to be coincidental. In fact, I take it to reveal something essential 
about Bergson’s take on the scientific study of living things. Life unfolds through them by 
overcoming material obstacles but without ever fully attaining the heights toward which it tends. 
The élan is always incompletely realized, always in-process, frustrated by its material realizations. 
But just as the élan needs that materiality through which to unfold itself, we need images in order 
to think—even if through them we always necessarily fall short of our objects of thought. Life 
cannot be thought apart from its images. But these images work best when they can be turned back 
on themselves, made to reveal how they are functioning as images, what their imagistic limitations 
are. This, I claim, is the appropriate rejoinder to Al-Saji’s suggestion that the image of the canal 
does not do justice to the complex relation of life to matter: of course not, it’s an image, and life 
is precisely that which exceeds its material images, but those images are still essential to capturing 
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and delimiting it for purposes of understanding, just as for purposes of effective action. The canal 
achieves this as an image, while at the same time demonstrating the limitations of imagistic 
thinking.  
Images of life aren’t just necessary evils. They’re potentially productive ingredients in the 
development of scientific theory in their own right. I want to conclude now with a distinction made 
by Peter Godfrey-Smith between philosophies of science and nature, and to suggest that both 
Bergson and Whitehead are situating the former within the latter, delineating its boundaries in 
accordance with the limits of imagistic thought, and granting to the philosophy of nature a meta-
scientific purview. While the philosopher of science attends, on Godfrey-Smith’s account, to the 
specificities of some domain of research, its requisite boundaries, presuppositions, and operative 
images, the philosopher of nature “comments on the overall picture of the natural world that 
science, and perhaps other types of inquiry, seem to be giving us” (2001: 284). Where the scientific 
thinker makes use of helpful images, expedient categorizations, and ontologically suspect 
distinctions in the service of some research program, the philosopher of nature feels no such 
obligation. This philosopher comes, in a certain sense, after empirical research, and tries to 
synthesize its findings with insights generated by other investigations in other domains in order to 
do as much justice as possible to the global complexity of the situation. Often this is unhelpful, 
even paralyzing for scientific research. Science has to delimit, cordon, isolate. That’s how it works 
so well. But the philosopher of nature has concerns over and above explanatory utility.  
Bergson and Whitehead ought, I think, to be understood as philosophers of nature in this 
sense. Their systems function both as commentaries on the findings generated by the biology of 
their time as well as attempts to supplement them with theories that remained foreclosed to their 
methodologies, that of life itself. If Bergson’s élan and Whitehead’s creativity are part of a 
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philosophy of nature, then their use of the image of the canal ought, I think, to be taken as part of 
a philosophy of science. For science proceeds by decomposing the living world into parts graspable 
in mechanistic terms and therefore conducive to analytic manipulation. That’s exactly how images 
work. They isolate and delimit for some purpose, in service of some end. Images are always 
images-of, never all-inclusive, always located within a more complex whole; science, too, is 
always a study-of, never fully or finally exhaustive of its objects, always located within a 
philosophy of nature whose sphere is wider—and, indeed, metaphysical. By tracing embryology’s 
concept of canalization back to the image of canal as it is situated, in both Whitehead and Bergson, 
within a larger field of activity—of temporality, creativity, life—I hope to have indicated one way 
in which these thinkers recommend a philosophy of science concomitant with a philosophy of 
nature that will always nonetheless necessarily outstrip it.  
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